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Intellectual Knowledge of Material 
Particulars in Thomas Aquinas: An 
Introduction 
James B. South 
It is well known that St. Thomas Aquinas holds that the primary 
objects of the human intellect are the essences of material objects. It 
is also well known that Thomas also provides an account of how the 
human intellect can know material singulars. This is an important 
problem for Thomas insofar as basic metaphysical, psychological, and 
cognitional issues come into play. Moreover, Thomas is explicit that 
the knowledge of material singulars is necessary, partcularly in 
practical contexts. Most discussions of the knowledge of material 
singulars frequently revolve around the content of such knowledge. 
What is it that is known when the intellect knows such singulars? In 
addition, while there is general agreement that the unity of the human 
person makes intellectual knowledge of material singulars possible, 
there is little discussion of how this unity is possible. Accordingly, 
as a prolegomena to understanding Thomas's full account of our 
knowledge of the singular, in this paper I shall discuss the general 
outline of the mechanics by which the human intellect knows material 
singulars. The major focus of the essay will consist in an explication 
of the metaphysical basis for Thomas's position. Given the radically 
different ontological status of the objects of sense and the objects of 
intellect, how is it that the intellect can know material singulars that 
are primarily and directly objects of sense cognition. 1 
Thomas's views on the human composite are well known. It has 
been demonstrated that Thomas believes that the self-subsistent 
intellect is able to account for the unity of the human person insofar 
as it is the principle through which esse is bestowed on the entire 
human person, both body and soul.2 However, in this paper I want to 
consider the problem from a slightly different angle. I shall focus on 
Thomas's psychology of cognition. In particular, I want to 
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concentrate on a problem that arises from Thomas's committment to 
a form of dualism. This dualism is best seen in his account of the 
relationship between the operations of sense and intellect. As we 
shall see, Thomas is insistent on three points. The first point is that 
the sensory powers are organic. Coupled with that claim is the 
emphasis Thomas places on the non-organic nature of the intellect. 
Finally, Thomas holds that there is a close relationship between the 
organic sense powers and the non-organic intellect insofar as the 
origin of all our cognition is from sense cognition. I want to show 
how Thomas is able to consistently hold these three positions. In the 
first part of this paper, I shall briefly sketch Thomas's account of the 
respective operations of sense and intellect paying particular attention 
to how they interact. Following that, I shall consider the issue in 
which the problems associated with Thomas's view become most 
readily apparent. This issue is the account Thomas gives of the 
intellectual knowledge of material singulars. I shall conclude by 
explaining the principle by which Thomas is able to account for the 
respective causal relationships between intellect and sense in the case 
of the knowledge of the singular. 
The mediating role of sensation is central to Thomas's account of 
cognition. Thomas recognizes that there are both material objects in 
the external world and an immaterial intellect that must come to some 
knowledge through the causal efficacy of the external objects. The 
first step to intellectual knowledge, therefore, is sensory cognition. 
Despite their differences, the need for some form (forma) is a 
common condition of both sense and intellect. This is due to the fact 
that all cognition arises through the mediation of form. 3 In the case 
of sense cognition, this form is an image (imago) of the sensible 
object. The matter of the material object is not itself present in the 
sense power. The likeness in the sense power is adequate for sensory 
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cognition but not for intellectual cognition. Therefore the intellect 
itself must make the potentially intelligible forms existing in the sense 
power actually intelligible.4 
In sense cognition, the sense power, which is nothing more than 
an "informed" sense organ, is immuted by an external sensible object. 
In a properly functioning sense power, the proper sensible is then 
immediately sensed. 5 For example, when we see a tree, it is due to 
the causal influence of the tree as a sensible object as well as the 
properly functioning sense organ. It must be noted that it is not the 
tree that we see immediately; we see simply the visible accidents of 
the tree. It is due to the work of the internal senses, particularly the 
imagination, the cogitative power, and sense memory, that we are able 
to produce within ourselves a likeness (similtudo) of the tree. It is this 
likeness of a particular thing, which Thomas calls a "phantasm," that 
is the basis for the operation of the intellect from which we obtain our 
knowledge of the essence of a tree. 6 
Thomas marks this distinction between the sensing of proper 
sensibles and the sensing of material objects by a difference in 
terminology. When a particular sense is confronted by a proper 
sensible, the confrontation is effected by what Thomas calls a 
"sensible species." Sensation is nothing other than the reception of 
such a sensible species from the object in a properly functioning 
sense organ. Thus, for example, when the eye is confronted by a tree, 
the sensible species of green "immutes" the eye in such a way that the 
eye sees green. When, however, an internal sense power coordinates 
all the proper sensible species into a likeness of a tree, Thomas calls 
the result a "phantasm."7 
It is necessary to say a little bit more about the phantasm and its 
role. The importance of the phantasm cannot be stressed too much. 
It is from the phantasm and not from the external senses that the 
intellect initially receives its material. 8 The relevant internal senses 
are, of course, each organic in nature, i.e., each is present in some 
organ of the body.9 Accordingly, the phantasm itself is in some way 
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material. This materiality of the phantasm explains why Thomas 
states that it is only potentially intelligible. In the operation of the the 
intellect, the intellect prescinds from any consideration of individual 
principles and considers the material object "in general". When the 
intellect thinks the concept "tree" it can consider any tree, not just the 
particular tree that is represented by a phantasm. This ability to think 
by means of universal concepts arises from the fact that the intellect 
alone, as a cognitive power of the human soul, is independent of any 
bodily organ. 10 
Despite Thomas's insistence on the non-organic nature of the 
intellect, he nevertheless is committed to the view that the intellect 
can never think without "conversion" to phantasms present in the 
internal senses. 11 Such a position follows readily enough if it is 
indeed the case that the human being is a unified knower. To better 
understand the necessity of the phantasm, it will help to consider 
briefly Thomas's contrast between two different intellectual powers. 
These two pcwers are, of course, the agent intellect and the potential 
intellect. It is the potential intellect that thinks by forming universal 
concepts such as "tree." It is also the potential intellect that is 
responsible for all higher level discursive reasoning processes. These 
include both the formation of propositions and judgements as well as 
those processes that require some combination of sentences, e.g. a 
syllogism. 12 The agent inte"tlcct is responsible for making the 
potentially intelligible phantasm actually intelligible. The agent 
intellect itself does not posess any knowledge of its own. It primary 
task is the creation of an intelligible species that becomes the means 
by which the potential intellect forms a concept. This intelligible 
species is a universal representation of the information that is present 
to the agent intellect in the particular phantasm. 13 
Thomas typically describes twp functions of the agent intellect. 
He states that the agent intellect illuminates the phantasm and 
abstracts the intelligible species. 1'1 Both of these functions must be 
carefully understood. The illumination of the phantasm results in the 
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phantasm becoming "adaptable" (habilia) so that abstraction can take 
place. 15 The use of the term illumination is explicable within the 
context of the "natural light" (lumen naturale) of the agent intellect. 
This light is to be understood as a participation in the the light that 
God possesses. Thomas contrasts such light with both the light of 
faith (lumen fidei) and the light of prophecy (lumen prophetiae). 
Unlike these latter two types of light that can allow a person to know 
things that are not naturally knowable, the light of the agent intellect 
is a natural light (lumen naturale). 16 Presumably, then, Thomas is 
simply pointing out that the agent intellect is required in order for 
humans to have any knowledge of those things that are the proper 
objects of human knowledge, namely, the essences of material 
things. 17 Thomas offers an important analogy to further underscore 
his position. He compares the illumination of the agent intellect to 
the greater power acquired by the sensitive power in virtue of its 
conjunction (coniunctio) with the intellectual power. 18 I will return 
to the full significance of this comparison later. Right now, what is 
important is to notice that Thomas takes this illumination by the agent 
intellect to be due to the general relationship between the sense power 
and the intellect. 
The obviously metaphorical connotation of "light" in the context 
of a discussion of intellectual cognition directs us to the basic 
understanding of Thomas's position. The root of the metaphor 
consists in the comparison of sight to intellectual knowledge. Thomas 
states that there are three things required for an act of vision: the 
object seen, the visual power that is the subject of seeing, and light to 
make the act of vision possible. In a comparable manner, there are 
three things required for intellectual knowledge: the phantasm as the 
bearer of information about the external world, the potential intellect 
as the knowing power, and the agent intellect as what mediates 
between the two other requirements. Accordingly, the illumination 
of the phantasm is at bottom the act that makes the unintelligible 
phantasm actually intelligible 19 
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The second role of the agent intellect follows (logically, if not 
temporally) from the illumination, i.e. preparation, of the phantasm. 
The agent intellect "abstracts" (abstrahere) the intelligible species 
from the illuminated phantasm. This abstraction of the the intelligible 
species is what allows the potential intellect to consider the natures 
(naturae) of material things.20 What this means in practice is that the 
intellect is able to think about material objects in terms of their 
essential principles and not as they are represented by the phantasm. 
The intellect can do this because the intelligible species does not 
reproduce the individual conditions that are present in the phantasm. 
Once abstraction occurs, the abstracted intelligible species informs 
(informare) the potential intellect. 21 This intelligible species is a 
likeness (similitudo) of the thing actually understood, i.e., the essence 
of a material object. Thomas is quick to point out that the intelligible 
species is representative of the same thing that the phantasm 
represents. However,- the intelligible species represents only what 
pertains to the nature of the material object. 22 In this way, then, 
Thomas keeps open the channel of causality from the external object. 
The problem that arises from Thomas's discussion of the 
phantasm, agent intellect, and intelligible species concerns the precise 
mapping of the relationship between the organic phantasm and the 
purely immaterial intellect. More precisely the nature of the causal 
interaction between the immaterial agent intellect and the phantasm 
existing in the organic internal sense power remains to be explained. 
Thomas's primary attempt to explain this causal relationship consists 
in his claim that the agent intellect and the phantasm are related as 
principle and instrumental cause.Z3 An example of a 
principle/instrumental causal relationship would be a person using a 
spoon to eat soup. The spoon is merely an instrument by which the 
person, the principle cause, eats soup. Similarly, Thomas suggests, 
since the phantasm is itself only potentially intelligible, it cannot be 
itself a sufficient cause for intellectual knowledge. It is simply a tool 
by which the agent intellect makes an intelligible species. The 
Aquinas on Intellectual Knowledge 91 
phantasm is, however, a necessary cause insofar as it provides the 
basis, or matter (materia), from which the universal intelligible 
~pecies is abstracted. 24 These two explanations do not give us much 
information as they stand. A fuller explanation will have to wait until 
it has been explained how Thomas accounts for the unity of the 
human and consequently how there can be one operation using two 
distinct powers. What is clear at this point is that Thomas is 
committed to the view that the agent intellect somehow uses the 
phantasm in order for it to produce an intelligible species that can in 
tum be the principle from which intellectual cognition can originate. 
Of course, the generation of the intelligible species does not 
exhaust the activity of the intellect. The potential intellect, when 
informed by this intelligible species, itself generates what Thomas 
calls a concept (conceptus) or word (verbum) as the term of its act. 
It is important to note the difference between the intelligible species 
and the concept or mental word. The intelligible species is the 
principle, or beginning of intellectual knowledge, while the concept 
is the terminus of intellectual knowledge. Action occurs through 
some form and the intelligible species is the form through which 
human intellectual knowledge is possible. The mental word is the 
result of this action of human knowledge. It is constituted through the 
act that the intelligible species begins. 25 In the act of understanding, 
the intellect forms within itself an intention of the object understood. 
This intention is like the object, and it follows that, in forming this 
intention, the intellect understands the object itself.26 This intention 
is the effect of the act of knowledge. 27 
Although this intention is the result of the act of knowledge, it is 
not what we know, except secondarily; we know the nature of the 
object. However, the intention can be known by a reflexive act of the 
intellect in which the intellect knows the concept as an object. 28 In 
this way only is it possible to say that the intention is the object 
known. 
The representative nature of the concept formed by the possible 
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intellect must be carefully understood. An object is known insofar as 
it is represented to the intellect and not insofar as it exists in the 
intellect. The intention, as a likeness existing in the knower, is not a 
principle by which the intellect knows the object as it is existing in 
the intellect. Rather it is a principle of knowing insofar as it has a 
relationship to the object known. An object is known, then, through 
the mode by which the likeness existing in the intellect is 
representative of the object.29 Thus the intention is ordered to the 
object as an end. The intellect only forms an intention of the object 
within itself so that it might know the object. 
This intention is also referred to by Thomas as the formation of 
a definition, or of a process of division or composition. These are 
expressed by language. A term signifies a definition, while a 
proposition signifies a division or composition on the part of the 
intellect. Accordingly words do not signify the intelligible species, 
but rather the intention which is the result of the activity of the 
possible intellect. 30 
After providing this brief summary of the respective roles of 
sense and intellect in the cognitive process, it is possible to see the 
problem facing Thomas in stark outline. There can be no doubt that 
Thomas wants to claim both that the phantasm exerts some causal 
influence on the agent intellect and also that the agent intellect is the 
primary catalyst in the production of the intelligible species. The 
crucial question left involves specifying the precise mechanism that 
can account for the cooperation between the organic sense powers and 
the non-organic intellect. There are two problems here. First, how 
can something material act on something immaterial? Second, how 
can something immaterial act on something material? I believe that 
the best way to begin to answer these questions can be found in 
Thomas's discussion of a rather neglected issue, namely how the 
intellect is able to know material singulars. After a consideration of 
the major texts in which Thomas discusses this issue, it will be 
possible to see what it is that allows for the precise relationship 
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between sense and intellect. 31 
II 
The earliest substantive text on the problem of intellectual 
knowledge of material singulars is found in the Commentary on the 
Sentences. 32 Thomas stakes out familiar territory. He states that all 
cognition is through the action of forms. Forms, of themselves, are 
universal and through them the intellect is not able to reach to a 
knowledge of sensible singulars. Since the proper objects of the 
intellect as it is united with a body are these forms, it follows that the 
intellect directly knows these universal immaterial forms. In contrast, 
the singular is known through the senses. Indirectly, however, and by 
a kind of reflection (reflexio ), the intellect can know the singular. It 
reaches this indirect knowledge from its knowledge of its proper 
object by returning to its act. From this act it can return to the 
intelligible species by which the proper object is known. In turn, 
from the species it can consider the phantasm from which the species 
itself was abstracted and through the phantasm it can known the 
singular. 33 What Thomas has done here, of course, is simply retrace 
the steps by which the intellect comes to know. By thi.5 retracing the 
intellect knows the singular object that was the causal basis for the 
proper knowledge in the first place. 
This programmatic text is admittedly sketchy but clear enough 
given what we now know concerning sensation, the phantasm, the 
agent intellect and the intelligible species through which the intellect 
knows. What Thomas is claiming is that there is a direct causal 
connection between the object perceived and the intellectual 
knowledge we acquire from it. While the sense powers, because they 
are corporeal, cannot have intellectual knowledge of the singular, the 
intellect can have intellectual knowledge of the objects of sense 
insofar as its knows the source of its proper knowledge. It reaches 
this knowledge by a kind of reflection (reflexio) by which it goes back 
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(redit) to its sources. Issues that must still be clarified include the 
precise nature of the retracing involved and, more particularly, the 
meaning of reflexio. It must be noted that in this text Thomas does 
not give us any indication of how such an act is possible. 
Several times in the Disputed Questions on Truth Thomas gives 
us more information concerning the intellectual knowledge of 
material singulars. Here his frequent way of stating the knowledge of 
the singular that we possess is to say that we have such knowledge 
per accidens. Again this is because the intellect knows directly only 
the universal natures of material objects. The intellect can, however, 
per accidens mix with singulars inasmuch as it is continuous with 
(continuatur) the sensitive powers. This continuation (continuatio) 
works in two ways. In one way inasmuch as the sensitive powers 
terminate toward the intellect. This is understood along the lines of 
what occurs in the motion which is from things towards the soul. In 
this way, the intellect knows the singular through a certain reflection 
just as the mind, by knowing its object, returns (redit) in knowledge 
to its act, and then returns to the intelligible species that is the 
principle of its act, and finally returns to the phantasm from which the 
intelligible species had been abstracted. In this way, the intellect 
receives some knowledge of the singular. 34 
In a second way, there is a motion from the soul to external 
bodies. Such a motion begins from the mind and proceeds to the 
sensitive part, just as the mind rules (regit) the inferior powers. In 
this way, mind mixes with singulars through the medium of the 
cogitative power, which is also called the particular reason and has a 
particular organ in the body, namely the middle of the brain.35 This 
fact helps to explain the second mode of per accidens intellectual 
knowledge of the singular. This mixing of the intellect with the 
cogitative power gives the first speculative knowledge which is had 
of the singular, although it is speculative only per accidens since it is 
the cogitative power that performs the actual cognitive operation. It 
is important to note as well the stress that Thomas places on the fact 
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of the organic nature of the cogitative power. He is insistent on the 
strict demarcation between intellect and sense insofar as they are 
non-organic and organic respectively. 
The next text to be considered is also from the Disputed 
Questions on Truth. Again, Thomas states that our intellect knows 
the singular only per accidens. He has recourse to Aristotle36 and 
argues that the phantasm is related to the intellect as sensible objects 
(sensibilia) are to sense and he gives as an example colors which are 
outside the soul and yet are related to sight (visus). The analogy 
consists in comparing the abstraction that must take place for the 
sensible species to exist in the soul with the abstraction of the 
intelligible species from the phantasm. The term "abstraction" which 
Thomas here uses is not, as we have seen, his usual way of talking 
about sense cognition. However it is useful for the analogy insofar as 
Thomas wants to claim that just as sense cognition is continuous with 
(continuatur) the sense object, so too the intelligible species is 
continuous with the phantasm. 37 
Thomas immediately qualifies his analogy. In sense cognition the 
species or likeness which is abstracted from the thing external to the 
soul is related directly to the sensible thing as its object. However, 
the intelligible species or likeness in the intellect does not bear this 
same relation to the phantasm. The phantasm is not what is known 
but is rather a medium of knowledge. Here Thomas has recourse to 
another analogy. In this case he considers a sense object reflected in 
a mirror. The sense is directed to the likeness in the mirror not as to 
an external thing, but rather to a likeness of an external thing. 38 From 
this analogy, Thomas draws the conclusion that the intellect does not 
know the phantasm directly as an object but by a reflection on the 
phantasm it returns (redit) to a knowledge of the phantasm. It arrives 
at this knowledge by considering the nature of its act and the nature 
of that from which it abstracted the intelligible species, namely, the 
phantasm. Again the mirror analogy plays a role. In sight, the sense 
is brought directly to a knowledge of the thing reflected through a 
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likeness received from a mirror. But this is only possible by a sort of 
reversion (reversionem) through the object to the image itself in the 
mirror. 
From these considerations, then, Thomas draws the conclusion 
that the intellect has some knowledge of the particular according to a 
continuation ( continuatio) of the intellect to the imagination insofar 
as it can reflect on the phantasm, a likeness of the singular, from 
which the -intelligible species is abstracted.39 The important new 
element in both this passage and the preceding passage from the 
Disputed Questions on Truth concerns the use of the words 
continuatur and continuatio.40 Like the passage from the 
Commentary on the Sentences, in these passages Thomas affirms that 
the intellect does not know the singular directly but only indirectly, or 
per accidens, through a reflection on its own act. This reflexive 
knowledge by which the intellect comes to some knowledge of the 
singular is now explained as being possible through the continuatio 
of the intellect with the interior senses and the continuatio of the 
external senses with the sensible objects. 
It is clear that the reflexive knowledge is simply the ability of the 
intellect to retrace its own cognitive processes. But as Berube 
forcefully points out there is no implication here of a temporal priority 
of direct to indirect knowledge. Rather these are two terms to the 
same cognitive act. The direct act terminates in the universal while 
the indirect act terminates in the singular.41 The two types of 
knowledge are achieved by the same universal intelligible species. 
Thomas must explain how this reflexive knowledge is possible? How 
does the immaterial intellect know a material singular by means of a 
universal intelligible species derived from an intentionally existing 
phantasm in a material organ? Echoing Aristotle, Thomas states that 
properly speaking it is not the sense or the intellect which knows, but 
the human knows through both powers. The unity of the individual 
knower is at stake here.42 From the two texts we have just seen from 
the Disputed Questions on Truth, it is clear that Thomas has advanced 
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from his discussion in the Commentary on the Sentences. He is now 
using the terms "continuatio" and "continuatur" to explain how this 
indirect knowledge is possible. But it is not yet clear what the force 
of these terms is. More importantly, it is still not clear how he will 
account for the unity of the knower. 
In the Disputed Questions on the Soul, Thomas reiterates what he 
has said previously. The intellect knows the material singular because 
it is conjoined (conjuncta) to the body. It does not, however, know 
the singular directly, but rather by a reflection. Thomas emphasizes 
that this is possible by the reversion (revertitur) of the intellect to a 
consideration of its own act. However, Thomas also emphasizes that 
the cogitative power and the imagination are necessary for this 
consideration to take place since it is the phantasm that the intellect 
reaches in knowing the singular. In addition he points out again the 
conjunction (adiunctio) of the intellect with these sense powers.43 
The Summa Theologiae shows no changes from the basic 
positions we have seen. Our intellect in not able to know the material 
singular directly but only indirectly by a kind of reflection. However, 
Thomas now explicitly situates this ability of the intellect within the 
context of the general necessity of all intellectual knowledge to tum 
to the phantasm as a condition of its occurence. This is even clearer 
evidence that the process of reflection is not a self-conscious activity 
consequent in time upon knowledge of the universal but is instead a 
natural ability of the intellect in its ordinary activity.44 
The last major text of Thomas concerning the problem at hand 
occurs in the Commentary on the "De anima". In commenting on 
Aristotle, Thomas distinguishes between the sense cognition of flesh 
and the intellectual cognition of the quiddity of flesh. It is also 
possible for the intellect to know both the flesh and the essence of 
flesh. It knows the quiddity by directly extending itself to the object, 
while it know~ the singular by a reflection insofar as it returns to the 
phantasm from which the intelligible species is abstracted. This is 
yet further evidence that the reflection involved in the intellectual 
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knowledge of the singular is not a self-conscious one.45 
Having gone through these texts of Thomas we are able to make 
out his general view of the intellectual knowledge of material 
singulars. First, and most importantly, there is an intellectual 
knowledge of the singular. However this knowledge is strikingly 
different from the proper knowledge of the intellect. It is indirect or 
accidental, while the knowledge of quiddity is direct and per se. It is 
possible because the intellect and the sense powers are in "contact" 
and insofar as the intellectual power "is continuous with" the sense 
power. Finally it takes place through a reflection (reflexio). 46 This 
latter point is to be understood primarily as a spontaneous, or non-
self-conscious act of the intellect although it can also be used when 
talking on a second order level about the process that occurs. 
III 
At this point, another frequently overlooked text in the Disputed 
Questions on Truth is of great help. In this text Thomas states that the 
cogitative power is the highest of the sensitive powers. In some way, 
then, the sense power comes in contact (attingit) with the lowest type 
of reason so that it can be said to pa1ticipate in this lowest type of 
reason. Thomas continues in this passage to explain how the contact 
between the cogitative power and the intellect arises. According to 
Thomas, this "contact" is in accord with the rule of Dionysius which 
states that the beginning of the second is in contact with 
(coniunguntur) the end of the first. 47 I believe that this rather cryptic 
passage is the key to understanding Thomas's account of the 
mechanism by which intellectual knowledge of material singulars is 
possible. Moreover, I believe that this passage points the way to an 
understanding of the relationship between the sense powers and the 
intellect. We saw above that Thomas uses the notion of participation 
in the context of the relation between sense and intellect. In 
conjucntion with the present passage, this consideration underscores 
Aquinas on Intellectual Knowledge 99 
the importance of the metaphysical foundation that Thomas provides 
to describe the relationship between sense and intellect. 
What I want to claim is that the principle invoked here by 
Thomas, which he calls "the rule of Dionysius", is the principle that 
makes intellectual knowledge of material singulars possible. In 
addition, this rule is used by Thomas to explain the general 
relationship between sense and intellect. This is because the principle 
accounts for the unity of the human person. It is precisely this unity 
that, as we have seen, is necessary for knowledge.48 In short, it 
explains how the intellectual and sense powers are able to work 
together. 
In order to see the importance of this principle for Thomas, it is 
sufficient to point out that this principle in invoked to explain how the 
immaterial soul can be the form of a material body. According to 
Thomas, the human soul is the most perfect of forms. As we have 
seen, the human soul contains an activity which is in no way 
dependent on the body, namely intellectual cognition. Now, because 
the actual being of any object is proportioned to its activity, it follows 
that the actual being of the human soul surpasses corporeal matter and 
is not totally contained in it but is touched by it. Inasmuch as the soul 
is touched by matter and its being (esse) is communicated to matter, 
it is the form of that matter. But it is only touched by matter because 
of the principle of Dionysius that the higest of the lowest is always 
touched by the lowest of the highest and therefore the human soul can 
communicate its being to the highest type of body, and from this 
communication a unity (unum) results composed of matter and form. 49 
Now, if this principle of Dionysius is capable of explaining the unity 
of the human person, then it can also explain the unity of the human 
cognitional powers, i.e., the relation between sense and intellect. In 
fact we have seen Thomas use it to account for the relation between 
the cogitative power and the intellect. Before showing how this 
principle explains both the knowledge of the material singular as well 
as the gen~ral relationship between intellect and sense, however, it is 
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necessary to understand somewhat better this principle itself. 
The principle under consideration has been called the "axiom of 
continuity. "50 This axiom is what makes possible the hierarchical 
worldview that Thomas, following Dionysius, putsforward. In the 
immediate context of the axiom, Dionysius is arguing that we learn 
about Divine Wisdom from all things. This Wisdom is the cause of 
the order of all things and is always linking the ends (tele) of the prior 
with the beginnings (archai) of the latter. Accordingly the order we 
see in things manifests the Divine Wisdom. Without going into the 
details of the Dionysian perspective, it is sufficient to note that this 
continuity holds together the Dionysian universe. 51 
The influence of Dionysius on the thought of Thomas is 
pervasive. 52 Within the context of this essay, the immediate influence 
is the role that the axiom of continuity plays. In the Latin text of 
Dionysius which Thomas had, the axiom was translated as "semper 
fines priorum coniungens principiis secundorum. "53 Already in the 
terminology of "coniugens" we can see the influence on Thomas. As 
we saw above, Thomas's accounts of the intellectual knowledge of 
material singulars frequently makes use of terminology that involves 
"contact" between the sense and intellectual powers. 54 
It should now be apparent that the "axiom of continuity" is the 
background for understanding Thomas's theory on the intellectual 
knowledge of the material singular. While previous commentators 
have been correct to notice the emphasis on the unity of the human 
knower, they have not always paid sufficient attention to the reason 
why this unity exists. It exists because of the basic continuity which 
the Divine Wisdom of God has ordained in a hierarchical universe. 
The immaterial intellect is continuous with the sensitive soul which 
in turn is continuous with the external physical world. It is this 
continuity that can account both for the general relationship between 
sense and intellect as well as the more specific issue of the intellectual 
knowledge of the material singular. 
The general relationship between sense powers and intellectual 
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powers is best exemplified by the joint causality exercised by the 
agent intellect and phantasm in the production of the intelligible 
species. It is the hierarchy of powers, in which the lower power is in 
continuity with the higher power through participation that accounts 
for this relationship. Thomas, as we have seen, called the agent 
intellect the principle cause and the phantasm the instrumental cause. 
Such a relationship can have a unity even though there are two 
different components. The diner and his spoon are two different 
things, yet his activity of digging is one thing. 55 
Consequently, when Thomas argues that the intellectual power is 
continuous with the sense powers and that this is the basis for the 
knowledge of the material singular, we are now in a position to see 
what he means. While the intellect directly knows the quiddity of the 
material object, indirectly it knows the particular insofar as it is 
continuous with the sensitive powers in which the material singular 
is represented in all its particularity. The reflexio that the intellect 
accomplishes to understand the singular is simply a way of glossing 
the activity made possible by this continuity. 56 
IV 
In this paper, I have tried to show that the foundation for 
understanding how intellectual knowledge of the material singular is 
possible presupposes an account of how intellectual knowledge in 
general is possible. This account relies on the relationship between 
an immaterial intellect and an organic internal sense. Thomas invokes 
a general neoplatonic metaphysical principle to explain the continuity 
between the highest organic cognitive power and the lowest 
immaterial cognitive power. It is because of the participation of the 
former in the latter that the human cognitive powers can achieve a 
unity in operation. 
The basis for this general account of knowledge also explains the 
more particular case of the intellectual knowledge of material 
102 Aquinas on Mind and Intellect: New Essays 
singulars. The continuity between the phantasm and the intelligible 
species produced by the agent intellect allows the potential intellect 
to "reflect" back on the phantasm. This reflection provides us with 
our knowledge of the singular. It is the phantasm, the product of 
internal sensory processes, that provides the likeness of the material 
object. This phantasm, in tum, provides the causal connection 
between the material object and the intellect. This connection allows 
the intellect to make judgments about and have knowledge of material 
singulars. 
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Notes 
l.D. Black, "The Influence of the De divinis nominibus on the Epistemology 
of St. Thomas Aquinas," Proceedings of the Patristic, Medieval, and 
Renaissance Conference 10 (1985), 43, has correctly stressed this 
ontological difference in the objects of sense and intellect. 
2.For a good recent discussion of Thomas's account of the unity of the 
human person, see A. Maurer, "Descartes and Aquinas on the Unity of a 
Human Being: Revisited," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 57 
(1993), 497-511. Older, but still valuable discussions can be found in G. 
Klubertanz, "The Unity of Human Activity," The Modern Schoolman 27 
(1949), 75-103; A. Pegis St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the 
Thirteenth Century (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1976 
reprint of 1934 edition). Maurer neatly summarizes the standard position in 
the following manner: "The human person, according to Aquinas, contains 
a dualism of body (matter) and soul (form): two incomplete components of 
the person's essence, unified by the person's one complete esse, which 
belongs per se to the soul but is communicated to the body, so that there is 
but one esse of the whole composite." 
3.De ver q. 10, a. 4. 
4.De ver q. 8, a. 9. 
5.Thomas discusses sense cognition in a variety of works. There is an 
important summary passage in the Quaestiones De anima, q. 13. For an 
excellent account of Thomas's theory of sense cognition, see G. Van Riet, 
"La theorie thomiste de Ia sensation externe," Revue philosophique de 
Louvain 51 (1952), 374-408. Van Riet stresses the essentially "physical" 
nature of sensation. On this account, an informed organ senses by being 
physically impressed by a species of a sensible object. The analogy favored 
by Thomas involves the impression of a seal on wax. The wax takes 
likeness of the seal as a form, but none of the matter of the seal is transferred 
to the wax. It is the sensible species that "transmits" this form from the 
sensible object to the sense organ. 
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6.Thomas refers to the phantasm as the likeness of a particular thing 
(similtudo rei particularis) at several places in his writings, e.g., Summa 
theolop,iae I, q. 84, a. 7, ad 2. This text, as well as other pertinent texts, is 
cited by E. P. Mahoney in his valuable account of Thomas's theory of 
cognition, "Sense, Intellect and Imagination in Albert, Thomas and Siger," 
in The Cambridge History (Jf Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. N. Kretzmann, 
et al., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 607. It must be 
noted that the phantasm also is only a likeness of the accidents of a material 
object. There is no sense cognition of the natures of such objects. For this 
point. see Summa theolof.:iae I, q. 57, a. I, ad 2. 
7.The fact that Thomas reserves the term "phantasm" for the likeness 
existing in the imagination, cogitative power, and sense memory has been 
emphasized by Mahoney, "Sense, Intellect and Imagination," 607, n. 18 who 
also provides references to the appropriate texts. 
8.De l'eritate, q. 18, a. 8, ad 5:"Intellectus autem accipit immediate non a 
sensibus exterioribus, sed interioribus." At Summa theologiae I, q. 85, a. 7, 
Thomas makes the important argument that the disposition of the 
imagination, cogitative power, and sense memory has a direct bearing on the 
operation of the intellect. 
9.For an introductory discussion of the internal senses in Thomas, see G. 
Klubertanz, "The Internal Senses in the Process of Cognition," Modern 
School man 18 (1941 ), 27-31. For some of Thomas's mot extensive 
discussions of the internal senses, see Quaestiones De anima, q. 13, ad 19 
and Su1-nnw theologiae I, q. 78, a. 4, Summa contra gentiles, II, c. 66. 
IO.Summa theologiae I, q. 75, a. 2, Summa contra gentiles, II, c. 60. 
II.Summa theologiae I, q. 84, a. 7. 
12.Summa theolop,iae I, q. 79, a. 2; Quaestiones De anima, q. 3. A useful 
discussion of the variety of operations performed by the potential intellect 
can be found in E. Franz, The Thomistic Doctrine of the Possible Intellect, 
Aquinas on Intellectual Knowledge 105 
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1950). 
13.Summa theologiae I, q. 79, a. 3 and a. 4; Summa contra gentiles, II, c. 
76; Quaestiones de anima, q. 4. 
14.See. for example, Summa theologiae I, q. 54, a. 4, ad 2:"Dicendum quod 
intellectus agentis est illuminare non quidem alium intelligentem, sed 
intelligibilia in potentia, inquantum per abstractionem facit ea intelligibilia 
in actu." For more on Thomas's theory of the agent intellect and its 
historical background, see E. P. Mahoney, "Themistius and the Agent 
Intellect in James of Viterbo and Other Thirteenth-Century Philosophers 
(Saint Thomas, Siger of Brabant and Henry Bate)," Augustiniana 23 ( 1973), 
428-441 who also cites and discusses important secondary literature. 
15.Summa theolrwiae I, q. 85, a. I, ad 4. 
16.Quaestiones de anima, q. 5, ad 6. Mahoney, "Sense, Intellect and 
Imagination," 610, n. 34, notes that Thomas sometimes uses the notion of 
lumen naturale to refer to the soul and at other times restricts it to the agent 
intellect. 
17 .Sometimes, Thomas is content to speak of the operation of the agent 
intellect in terms of making what is potentially knowable actually knowable. 
See, for example, Summa contra gentiles, II, c. 77: "Est igitur in anima 
intellectiva virtus activa in phantasmata, faciens ea intelligibilia actu; et haec 
potentia animae vocatur intellectus agens." 
18.Summa theologiae I, q. 85, a. I, ad 4: "Illuminantur quidem quia sicut 
pars sensitiva ex coniunctione ad intellectum efficitu virtuosoior, ita 
phantasmata ex virtute intellectus agentis redduntur habilia ut ab eis 
intentiones intelligibiles abstrahantur." 
19.Thomas is aware that the analogy is not exact. One disanalogy involves 
the fact that the light source required for vision is extrinsic to the person 
seeing. However, the light of the agent intellect is internal to the knower. 
For this point, see Summa contra gentiles, II, 77. Another disanalogy 
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involves the light source. In the case of vision, the sun is the principle from 
which all light flows. In the case of the agent intellect, though, the light is 
merely a participated light. For this point, see Quaestio de spiritualibus 
creaturis, a. 10. 
20.Summa theologiae I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 4. 
2l.Summa theologiae I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 1. 
22.Summa theologiae I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 3. 
23.De veritate, q. 10, a. 6, ad 7. 
24.Summa theologiae I, q. 84, a. 6. 
25.Quaestiones disputatae de potentia, q. 8, a. 1:: "Nam species 
intelligibilis, qua fit intellectus in actu, consideratur ut principium actionis 
intellectus, cum omne agens agat secundum quod est in actu; actu autem fit 
per aliquam formam, quam oportet esse actionis principium. Differt autem 
ab actione intellectus: quia praedicta conceptio consideratur ut terminus 
actionis, et quasi quoddam per ipsam constitutum." For further discussion 
of Thomas's theory of the concept see J. Peifer, The Concept in Thomism, 
(New York: Bookman Associates, 1952) and B. Lonergan, Verbum: Word 
and Idea in Aquinas (Notre Dame, In.: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1967). 
26.Summa contra gentiles, I, 53: "Per hoc enim quod species intelligibilis 
quae est forma intellectus et intelligendi principium, est similitudo rei 
exterioris, sequitur quod intellectus intentionem formet illi rei similem: quia 
quale est unumquodque, talia operatur; et ex hoc quod intentio intellecta est 
similis alicui rei, sequitur quod intellectus, formando huismodi intentionem, 
rem illam intelligat." 
27.De veritate, q. 4, a. 2: "Ipsa enim conceptio est effectus actus 
intelligendi .... " 
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28.Summa contra gentiles, IV, 11: " .. .inde apparet quod aliud est intelligere 
rem, et aliud est intelligere ipsam intentionem intellectam, quod intellectus 
facit dum super suum opus refliecitur .... " For a good discussion of the 
various meanings of "reflection" in Thomas, see F. Putallaz, Le sens de La 
reflexion chez Thomas d'Aquin (Paris: J. Vrin, 1991), 117-208. 
29.De veri tate, q. 2, a. 5, ad 17: " ... aliquid cognoscitur, secundum quod est 
in cognoscente repraesentatum, et non secundum quod est in cognoscente 
existens .... et inde est quod non per modum quo similitude rei habet esse in 
cognoscente, res cognoscitur, sed per modum quo similitude in intellectu 
existens est representativa rei .... " 
30.Summa theologiae I, q. 85, a. 5: "Et similiter intellectus humanus non 
statim in prima apprehensione capit perfectam rei cognitionem; sed primo 
apprehendit aliquid de ipsa, puta quidditatem ipsius rei, quae est primum et 
proprium obiectum intellectus; et deinde intelligit proprietates et accidentia 
et habitudines circumstantes rei essentiam. Et secundum hoc necesse habet 
unum apprehensum alii componere et dividere; et ex una compositione et 
divisione ad aliam procedere, quod est ratiocinari." 
31.For reasons of space, I shall ignore another important topic that involves 
consideration of the knowldge of material singulars. This problem involves 
the precise "content" of our knowledge of singulars. It is this topic that is 
the focus of most of the secondary literature concerning knowledge of the 
singular. I hope to return to this issue in the future. In addition, I make no 
reference to the "practical" aspects of knowledge of the singular. I shall 
limit my discussion to the way in which intellectual knowledge of material 
singulars enters into what Thomas calls "speculative" knowledge. 
32.For general discussions of Thomas's theory concerning the intellectual 
knowledge of material singulars, see C. Fabro, "La percezione intelligibile 
dei singolari materiali," Angelicum 16 (1939), 429-462; R. Allers, "The 
Intellectual Cognition of Particulars," Thomist 3 (1941), 95-163; G. 
Klubertanz, "St. Thomas and the Knowledge of the Singular," New 
Scholasticism 26 ( 1952), 135-166; C. Berube, La connaissance de 
l'individuel au moyen dge, (Montreal and Paris: Presses de I'Universite de 
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Montreal and Presses Universitaires de France, 1964 ); F. Peccorini, 
"Knowledge of the Singular: Aquinas, Suarez, and Recent Interpreters," 
Thomist 38 (1974), 606-655; A. Kenny, Aquinas on Mind (New York: 
Routledge, 1993), 111-118. It is regrettable that no discussion of this 
problem occurs inN. Kretzmann's useful study, "Philosophy of Mind," in 
The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993). I shall follow a chronological order in discussing Thomas's 
texts. However I am in agreement with Berube, who in this case following 
J. Webert ("'Reflexio,' Etude sur les operations reflexives dans Ia 
psychologie de saint Thomas d'Aquin," Melanges Mandonnet, I [Louvain, 
1930]) sees no important doctrinal development on this issue in the writings 
of Thomas. See especially Berube, La connaissance, 51. 
33./n IV Sententiarum, d. 50, q. 1 a. 3: "Anima ergo, cum est corpori 
conjuncta, non cognoscit nisi per formas a rebus acceptus; et ideo per 
potentiam illam cognoscitivam in qua formae a rebus omnino immaterialiter 
recipiuntur, directe singularia non cognoscit sed solummodo per potentias 
organis affixas; sed indirecte, et per quamdam reflexionem, etiam per 
intellectum, qui organo non utitur, cognoscit singularia; prout scilicet ex 
objecto proprio redit ad cognoscendum suum actum, ex quo actu redit in 
speciem, quae est intelligendi principium; et ex ea procedit ad 
considerandum phantasm, a quo species huiusmodi est abstracta; et sic per 
phantasma singulare cognoscit." For a good analysis of this text see Berube, 
La connaissance, 55-56. 
34.De veritate, q. 10, a. 5: "Sed tamen mens per accidens singularibus se 
immicet, in quantum continuatur viribus sensitivis, quae circa particularia 
versantur .... Uno modo in quantum motus sensitivae partis terminatur ad 
mentem, sicut accidit in motu qui est a rebus ad animam; et sic mens 
singulare cognoscit per quandam reflexionem, prout scilicet mens 
cognoscendo objectum suum, quod est aliqua natura universalis, redit in 
cognitionem sui actus, et ulterius in speciem quae est actus sui principium 
et ulterius in phantasma a quo species est abstracta; et sic aliquam 
cognitionem de singulari accipit." 
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35.De veritate, q. 10, a. 5: "Alia modo secundum quod motus qui est ab 
anima ad res, incipit a mente, et procedit in partem sensitivam, prout mens 
regit inferiores vires; et sic singularibus se immiscet mediante ratione 
particulari, quae est potentia quaedam individualis quae alia nomine dicitur 
cogitativa, et habet determinatum organum in corpore, scilicet mediam 
cellulam capitis." 
36.De anima, III, 7 (43lal7-b2). 
37.De veritate, q. 2, a. 6: "Sed per accidens contingit quod intellectus noster 
sigulare cognoscit; ut enim Philosophus dicit in III de anima, phantasmata 
se habent ad intellectum nostrum sicut sensibilia ad sensum, ut colores, qui 
sunt extra animam, ad visum; unde, sicut species quae est in sensu, 
abstrahitur a rebus ipsis, et per earn cognitio sensus continuatur ad ipsas res 
sensibiles; ita intellectus noster abstrahit speciem a phantasmatibus, et per 
earn cognitio eius quodammodo ad phantasmata continuatur." 
38.De veritate, q. 2, a. 6: "Quod similitudo quae est in sensu, abstrahitur a 
re ut ab objecto conoscibile, et ideo res ipsa per illam similitudinem directe 
cognoscitur; similitudo autem quae est in intellectu, non abstrahitur a 
phantasmate sicut ab objecto cognoscibili, sed sicut a media cognitionis, per 
modum quo sensus noster accipit similitudinem rei quae est in specula, dum 
fertur in earn non ut in rem quamdam, sed ut in similitudinem rei, unde 
intellectus noster non directe ex specie quam suscipit, fertur ad 
cognoscendum phantasma, sed ad cognoscendum rem cui us est phantasmata. 
Sed tamen per quamdam reflexionem redit etiam in cognitionem ipsius 
phantasmatis, dum considerat naturam actus sui, et specie per quam intuetur, 
et eius a quo speciem abstrahit, scilicet phantasmatis, sicut per similitudinem 
quae est in visu a specula accepta, directe fertur visus in cognitionem rei 
speculatae; sed per quamdam reversionem fertur per eamdem in ipsam 
similitudinem quae est in specula." 
39.De veritate q. 2, a. 6: "Inquantum ergo intellectus noster per 
similitudinem quam accepit a phantasmate, reflectitur in ipsum phantasma 
a quo speciem abstrahit, quod est similitudo particularis, habet quamdam 
cognitionem de singulari seundum continuationem quamdam intellectus ad 
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imaginationem." 
40.1 am not claiming that this is the first time Thomas uses these terms in a 
cognitional context. However, when discussing the problem of the 
knowledge of the singular in the Commentary on the Sentences, Thomas 
does not make use of this terminology, although, as I hope to show below, 
it was in the background of his account. 
41.Berube, La connaisance, 57. Of course it is possible to work this process 
out consciously, since it is precisely what Thomas does when discussing this 
problem. However, when Thomas speaks of this reflection, it is clear, as 
Berube emphasizes, that the knowledge of the material particular is not a 
self-conscious act, but is simply another aspect of intellectual knowledge. 
B. Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, (South Bend, Ind.: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), 170-171, would, accordingly, seem 
to place too much emphasis on the distinction between the metaphysician's 
explanation of reflection and the ability of "the mass of mankind" to know 
material singulars. In fact, Thomas is asserting both (1) how it is possible for 
the average person to know particulars and (2) how we can know that it is 
possible. It is the rejlexio which happens in (1) which is the basis for (2). 
42.De veritate q. 2, a. 6, ad 3: "Non enim, proprie loquendo, sensus aut 
intellectus cognoscunt, sed homo per utrumque, ut patet in I de anima." 
43.Quaestiones de anima, a. 20 ad l: "Ad primum quorum dicendum est, 
quod anima conjuncta corpori per intellectum cognoscit singulare, non 
quidem directe, sed per quamdam reflexionem; in quantum scilicet ex hoc 
quod apprehendit suum intelligibile, revertitur ad considerandum suum 
actum, et speciem intelligibilem quae est principium suae operationis; et eius 
speciei originem; et sic venit in considerationem phantasmatum, et 
singularium, quorum sunt phantasmata. Sed haec reflexio compleri non 
potest nisi per adiunctionem virtu tis cogitativae et imaginativae .... " 
44.Summa theologiae I, q. 86, a. I: "Dicendum quod singulare in rebus 
materialibus intellectus noster directe et primo cognoscere non potest .... 
Indirecte autem et quasi per quandam reflexionem, potest cognoscere 
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singulare, quia, sicut supra dictum, etiam postquam species intelligibiles 
abstraxerit, non potest secundum eas actu intelligere nisi convertendo se ad 
phantasmata, in qui bus species intelligibiles intelligit .... Et hoc modo format 
hanc propositionem: Socrates est homo." 
45.Sentencia libri De anima, III, 2: "Sed oportet quod alia potencia discernit 
esse carni, id est quod quid est carnis; set hoc contingit dupliciter: uno modo 
sic quod ipsa caro et quiditas carnis cognoscantur omnino potenciis ad 
inuicem diuisis, puta quod potencia sensitiva cognoscitur caro et potencia 
intellectiva cognoscitur quiditas carnis; ... alio modo contingit quod 
cognoscatur alio caro et quod quid est carni, non quod sit alia et alia 
potencia, set quod una et eadem potencia alio et alio modo cognoscit carnem 
et quod quid est eius; et istud oportet esse cum anima comparat universale 
ad singulare: ... cognoscit enim naturam speciei siue quod quid est directe 
extendendo se in ipsam, ipsam autem singulare per quandam reflexionem in 
quantum red it supra fantasmata a qui bus species intelligibiles abstrahuntur." 
46.In his very helpful study, F. Putallaz, Le sens de la rejlexion, 60-63 and 
118-123, argues that the notion of "reflection" with which Thomas is 
operating is more properly construed as "refraction" (refraction). Like a 
reflection, this consists of a return, but only an incomplete return. Rather 
than being directed inward, as in a complete reflection, it is directed outward 
towards the exterior object that sets in motion the cognitive process. The 
return, then, is a return on the concrete conditions of knowing. 
47.De veritate, q. 14, a. I, ad 9: "Ad nonum dicendum, quod potentia 
cogitativa est quod est altissimum in parte sensitiva, ubi attingit 
quodammodo ad partem intellectivam ut aliquid participet eius quod est in 
intellectiva parte infimum, scilicet rationis discursum, secundum regulum 
Dionysii, II cap. de divin. nomin., quod principia secundorum coniunguntur 
finibus primorum." 
48.The importance of this principle for the thought of Thomas as it relates 
to the unity of the human has been forcefully brought out by M. Dhavamony, 
Subjectivity and Knowledge in the Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas, 
(Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1965), l 0-27. However, at no point 
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does he apply this principle to explicate the problem of intellectual 
knowledge of material singulars. 
49.Quaestio de spiritualibus creaturis. a. 2: "Perfectissima autem formarum, 
id est anima humana, quae est finis omnium formarum naturalium, habet 
operationem omnino excedentem materiam .... Oportet quod esse ani mae 
humanae superexcedat materiam corporalem, et non sit totaliter 
comprehensum ab ipsa, sed tamen ali quo modo attingatur ab ea. . .. 
Inquantum vero attingitur a materia, et esse suum communicat illi, est 
corporis forma. Attingitur autem a materia corporali ea ratione quod semper 
supremum infimi ordinis attingit infimum suprimi ... ut fiat ex anima et 
corpore unum ex forma et materia." The central role of this passage has 
been stressed by Dhavamony, Subjectivity and Knowledge, 51. Rather 
surprisingly, some commentators on Thomas's account of the soul appear to 
see Thomas Aquinas simply as a follower of Aristotle in his account of the 
hylomorphic composition of body and soul. However, it is clear from 
passages such as this, as well as others that we shall see below, that Thomas 
has in fact supplemented Aristotle's basic hylomorphic view with this 
principle taken over from Dionysius. Two of the most recent studies on 
Thomas philosophy of mind, A. Kenny, Aquinas on Mind and N. 
Kretzmann, "Philosophy of Mind" make no mention of this principle when 
discussing Thomas's account of the relationship of soul and body. 
50.See B.Montagnes, "L'axiom de continuite chez Saint Thomas," Revue des 
Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques 52 ( 1968), 201-221. Montagnes 
provides an overview of the numerous passages in which Thomas invokes 
this axiom. From this list of passages, it is clear that Thomas uses several 
terms that we have encountered in his discussion of the knowledge of 
material singulars when talking about the continuity between various levels 
of psychological powers. Thomas uses the terms attingere, coniungere, 
coniunctio, continuatio, as well as participatio and participare when 
discussing this axiom of continuity. Other scholars have noticed the 
important general role this axiom plays in Thomas's account of the order of 
the universe. See Klubertanz, The Discursive Power, 155-156; E. P. 
Mahoney, "Metaphysical Foundations of the Hierarchy of Being according 
to Some Late Medieval and Renaissance; Philosophers," in Philosophies of 
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Existence: Ancient and Modern, ed. P. Morewedge, (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 1982), 169-172. More recently, 0. Blanchette, The 
Perfection of the Universe according to Aquinas, (University Park, [PA]: 
Penn State University Press, 1992), 191-202, has emphasized the key role 
this principle plays in Thomas's account of the hierarchy of being. 
Particularly noteworthy for our purposes is his discussion of the relation 
between soul and body as an example of this continuity. Also, F. O'Rourke, 
Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 
1992), 264, accurately describes this principle as "one of the most 
important laws governing the heirarchy of beings." O'Rourke, in a brief 
discussion of the principle and its relation to the human soul, also points out 
that it is this continuity that allows the soul to be a form of the body. Neither 
of these two commentators discusses the problem of the knowledge of the 
singular. 
51.For Dionysius's use of this principle, see The Divine Names, VII, 3. Good 
discussions of Dionysious's notion of hierarchy can be found in R. Roques, 
"L'univers dionysien: Structure hierarchique du monde seton le Pseudo-
Denys, (Paris: Aubier, 1954); P. Rorem, Pseudo-Dionysiu: A Commentary 
on the Texts and an Introduction to Their Influence (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993). 
52 .The influence of Diony~ius and Neoplatonism in general on the thought 
of Thomas Aquinas ha~ been emphasized by several scholars. The 
fundamental studies of C. Fabro, La nozione di partecipazione secondo S. 
Tommaso d'Aquino, 2nd edition, (Torino: Societa editrice internazionale, 
1950), and L. B. Geiger, La participation dans la philosophic deS. Thomas 
d'Aquin, 2nd edition, (Paris: J. Vrin, 1953) should be mentioned as 
important general studies. Thomas's notion of hierarchy has been usefully 
studied by E. P. Mahoney, "Metaphysical Foundations of the Hierarchy of 
Being," 166-67, 225-227, who stresses the role the thought of Dionysius has 
on Thomas and provides an extensive bibliography of earlier studies. In 
connection with the psychology of cognition, several scholars have noticed 
the important role that the notion of continuity has in Thomas's thought. C. 
Fabro, Percepcio y pensamiento, (Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de 
Navarra, 1978), 224-231 has stressed the metaphysical foundations of the 
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relation bewteen the sense powers and the intellectual powers and has 
pointed out the importance of Thomas's use of participation language to 
describe this foundation. Other scholars have noted the role that 
pC1rticipation language and continuity play in Thomas's discussion of the 
relation between ratio and intellectus. See, for example, J. Peghaire, 
lntellectus et ratio selon S. Thomas d'Aquin, (Paris: J. Vrin, 1936), 179-180; 
Blanchette, The Perfection of the Universe, 267-300. Recently, D. Black, 
"The influence of the De divinis nominibus," 41-52, has pointed out the 
importance of certain metaphysical issues when trying to come to terms with 
psychological issues. She, too, is concerned with the relation between ratio 
and intellectus and situates this distinction within the Dionysian context of 
continuity. She points out that Thomas refuses "to dichotomize" ratio and 
intellectus on the grounds that "what is possessed by means of participation 
alone in never perfected nor complete in the one who merely participates." 
(p. 47) Also, see the study of F. O'Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the 
Metaphysics of Aquinas whose monograph points out many points of contact 
between Thomas and Dionysius. 
53.For the Latin, see Dionysiaca. Recueil donnant !'ensemble des 
traductions latines des ouvrages attribues au Denis de l'areopage (Bruges: 
Desclee de Brouwer, 1937 -1950) Vol. 1, 407. This translation is cited and 
discussed by Montagnes, "L'axiom de continuite", 203. 
54.Montagnes, "L'axiom de continuite", 205-208, has gathered all the 
passages in the works of Thomas where he speaks of the "axiom of 
continuity" and specifically mentions Dionysius. In these passages we find 
the language which we have seen applied to the problem of the knowledge 
of the material particular or the relation between sense and intellect. Such 
terms as "attingit," "coniungit" and "continuatio" all appear. 
55 .Klubertanz, The Discursive Power, 166-17 4, discusses what he calls the 
"dynamic relationship" between sense and intellect both in the case of the 
agent intellect's use of the phantasm and in the case of the intellectuai 
knowledge of material singulars. 
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56.Thus Klubertanz, "St. Thomas and the Knowledge of the Singular," 148 
is correct to say that reflexio is an essentially unhelpful notion for 
understanding Thomas's view in that it gives no more information than to 
say that it is indirect knowledge. 
